There is a longstanding concern that material incentives might undermine prosocial motivations, leading to fewer blood donations, rather than to increase them. This paper provides an empirical test of how material incentives affect blood donations in a large-scale field experiment over three months involving more than 10,000 previous donors. We examine two types of incentives: a lottery ticket and a free cholesterol test. Lottery tickets significantly increase donations in particular among less motivated donors. The cholesterol test leads to no discernable impact on blood donations. To the contrary, the cholesterol test creates a small negative selection effect in terms of donations that have to be discarded.
I. Introduction
In medical emergencies, blood transfusions are often the only way to save an individual's life (Higgins, 1994) . A sufficient amount of blood donations is thus literally a matter of life or death.
Blood can still not be artificially produced and some components of the blood can only be stored for a short period of time. Moreover, the amount a single individual can donate is limited. Thus, in order to meet the demand for blood, a wide, and selective base of donors, willing to give blood when required, is needed.
Historically, many blood donation services have relied on voluntary, non-remunerated donations and thus on the pro-social motivation of their donors. 1 Despite the inherent free-rider problem of this policy, the arrangement seems to have worked satisfactorily for most of the time. Three problems have, however, emerged recently that increase the risk of blood shortages in the future.
First, innovations in surgery and oncological therapies lead to more aggressive medical treatments in cases that were previously thought inoperable or incurable, requiring larger amounts of blood transfusions (Davey, 2004) . Second, there is a general tightening of blood donation criteria, such as stepped up travel restrictions or restrictions to past blood recipients because of CJD. Third, there are widespread seasonal shortages due to lower supply, particularly in summer and early winter (Gilcher and McCombs, 2005) . In order to address these challenges, donation services either need to widen their donor base, or extract more donations from previous donors.
In this paper, we examine the latter possibility. Specifically, we examine whether the use of selective incentives leads to more blood donations in a population of blood donors that used to donate blood for prosocial motivs. Most economic models, even those incorporating prosocial preferences explicitly (e.g., Andreoni, 1990) , imply that selective incentives increase blood donations. Yet, there is a deep-rooted skepticism against using incentives in blood donations based on the conjecture that using incentives may attract at-risk donors, and -worse -undermine the motivation to donate blood. 2 The quality of blood or the risk that labile blood components are 1 While whole-blood donations are generally unpaid in developed countries (World Health Organization, 2004) , there are some countries where plasma donations, which can be done in higher frequencies, are paid. Indeed, Trimmel et al. (2005) find that, using survey measures, wholeblood donors are broadly more prosocially motivated than plasma donors. Intriguingly, of those plasma donors who would be willing to continue donating plasma if they were not paid anymore, there is no difference to whole-blood donors in terms of prosocial motives measured in the survey. Similar differences are found comparing whole-blood donors to the general population (Fernández Montoya et al., 1996) . See Piliavin (1990) for additional references.
2 Both conjectures are associated with Titmuss (1971) , who famously argued, "From our study of the private market in blood in the United States, we have concluded that the commercialization of blood donor relationships represses the expression of altruism, erodes the sense of community, [...] " (p. 245). 1 infectious largely depends on whether donors disclose any potential past risk behavior at the time of donor screening and that they do not donate blood in the period during which infectious donations escape detection by blood-screening tests (the so-called window-period). Even without using incentives, blood donation services have to reject donors or discard donations of about 10 percent of the people willing to donate. Thus, even regular donors fail to meet the donation criteria and medical screens all the time. The fear is that this selection problem may be exacerbated when incentives are used. Individuals then have an additional motivation to show up, even if they know that their donation is likely to fail the screenings. Moreover, they might be reluctant to disclose information that puts the donation reward at stake.
Research in psychology and economics backs the general claim that incentives can reduce voluntary contributions. If rewards are perceived as controlling, incentives may undermine prosocial motivation. This is often referred to as the motivational crowding effect (Deci and Ryan, 1985; Frey, 1997; Lepper and Greene, 1978) . A different mechanism that has received considerable attention are economic models incorporating a concern for one's image. In a recent paper, Bénabou and Tirole (2006) assume that individuals derive utility from looking "prosocial" and not greedy. In their model, it is possible that the use of incentives reduces prosocial activities if it conveys a strong signal about one's greediness. Both mechanism have been shown to be relevant in lab and field experiments. Gneezy and Rustichini (2000a,b) present evidence that incentives can considerably reduce prosocial behavior in different settings. In a clever field experiment, Ariely et al. (2007) manipulate the visibility of prosocial activities. They show that image concerns can render incentives completely ineffective. Thus, given this evidence, there may be good reasons why incentives have rarely been applied in blood donations.
In our study, we evaluate the concerns about the effectiveness of selective incentives based on a large-scale field experiment we conducted with over 10,000 blood donors. 3 Previous studies have mainly surveyed donors attitudes toward blood donation incentives, or conducted experiments on convenience samples that are not representative for the population of blood donors. The largest survey study (the Retrovirus Epidemiology Donor Study, REDS) based on more than 45,000 blood donors in the United States analyzes donors responses on whether they would be encouraged, discouraged or remain neutral if they were offered some incentives (Glynn et al., 2003) . Blood credits and free cholesterol testing were found to be the two incentives most likely to encourage net donations. The rate of net encouragement was 61 percent for the former and the latter incentive. Discouragement was relatively highest for compensatory cash and lottery and/or raffle tickets. In an earlier part of REDS, reported attitudes were linked to peoples at-risk donor status (Sanchez et al., 2001) . It was found that cash seems relatively more attractive for donors who are HIV test seeking and who engaged in behavioral risks in the past. People encouraged by free medical testing were also found to be more HIV test seeking. There are no significant differences in the encouragement of at-risk donors when attitudes towards lottery tickets are assessed. However, both studies are based on reported attitudes and it is not clear how they translate into behavior. In contrast to survey studies, the experiment we conducted measures behavior. We apply two different selective incentives: Some donors are offered a free cholesterol test, others are offered a lottery ticket.
Studies that analyze individual behavior and apply a randomized design are rare and often involve non-representative samples. From the available studies, no consensus finding emerges.
One experiment finds that incentives work and increase blood donations (Ferrari et al., 2001) , two that they are ineffective (Reich et al., 2006; Royse, 1999) , and one even finds that incentives reduce participation in a preparatory health examination, at least in one subsample (Mellström and Johannesson, forthcoming) . Yet, it is not clear to what extent these differences are driven by differences in samples, or by subtle differences in the way the incentives are administered.
Moreover, none of the studies analyzes any selection effects of at-risk donors. We are not aware of any experimental study on the effect of incentives on the selection of at-risk donors.
This study is with regular blood donors who were unaware that incentives were evaluated. 4
Our data contains information on basic demographics as well as on peoples donation history. This allows us to look in a systematic way how the responses to the treatments vary between subsamples for which theories predict different responses. Further, the study allows us to differentially analyze two important consequences of applying selective incentives in the context of blood donations. First, there are the consequences on generated usable donations, our primary dependent variable. Second, there are the effects on selection. We take the fraction of rejected donations as a proxy for the hazard of attracting at-risk donors. Even among previous donors, 10 percent of the donors or donations have to be discarded, as they fail one or more of the pre and post donation screening criteria such as past sexual behavior or markers for infectious diseases.
The overall picture that emerges from our experiment is that material incentives have no general negative effects. To the contrary, when looking at the overall experimental outcomes, we find that offering a lottery ticket increases usable donations by 5 percentage points over a baseline donation rate of 42 percent. By contrast we find no economically and statistically significant effect of the free cholesterol test on usable donations. We further find that offering the lottery ticket is significantly more effective than appealing to donors without incentives, or offering a free cholesterol test.
Further findings show that the treatment effects vary between subsamples in interesting ways. It is mainly people who donated only infrequently in the past who positively respond to the experiment and increase donations (and not donors who have revealed a strong preference for blood donations in the past). This pattern is evidence of heterogeneity in the motivation for blood donations. When we examine different splits of the sample, such as by age or gender, we find no significant differences in the responses to the treatments in these subsamples. This reinforces our interpretation that the driving force behind the different responses is differences in the motivation to donate blood.
With regard to possible selection effects of our treatments, we find no evidence that offering the lottery ticket in any way attracts donors that have a higher propensity to generate a rejected donation. There is some evidence that offering the cholesterol test leads to a somewhat higher risk of a donor or a donation being rejected, especially in women.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section II describes the empirical setup of our study, and explains the details of the treatments. It also discusses the behavioral predictions for the different treatments. Section III presents the results. Section IV concludes.
II. The Empirical Setup
We conducted a field experiment during three months during the summer of 2006 in four blood donation centers in the canton of Zurich, Switzerland. The study was conducted in close collaboration with the Zurich Blood Donation Service of the Swiss Red Cross (Stiftung Zürcher Blutspendedienst, henceforth SRC). Subjects in this field experiment were individuals registered in the database of the blood donation service.
If an individual ever donated blood in one of the four donation services, he or she was registered in the database of the SRC. The individual would then subsequently be invited to donate blood again at one of the four donation centers (the center is determined by proximity to the town the individual lives in). The donors are mailed an invitation. Each invitation comes with a specific date, approximately three weeks ahead, in order to avoid congestion at the donation center.
The SRC starts inviting individuals after four months have passed since the last invitation (or longer, if the donors so indicate). Of those eligible, the SRC starts sending out invitations, in no particular order. If an individual has ignored seven consecutive invitations, the SRC stops sending them invitations.
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A. The Treatments
The experimental intervention extended the standard procedure according to which donors are usually approached. This standard procedure was also applied during summer for the fraction of donors forming the control group.
For the experimental intervention, treatment specific additional information was added to the regular written invitation. Three treatments are distinguished revealing specific information on the summer campaign. In each case, this information is provided on a card (15x21 cm) showing a flower meadow on the face and the accompanying text "This summer, you can make a difference". The information on the reverse side differed between treatments. In all treatments, it was explained that the blood donation service found it difficult to meet demand during the summer, and that this opened the possibility of significant shortages. In the appeal treatment, the card then stated "In order to prevent this, we are particularly relying on your voluntary donation during the summer months. We therefore especially invite you with this call to donate blood.
Many thanks!
Zurich Blood Donation Service SRC"
In the second treatment, in addition to the information provided in the appeal treatment, a cholesterol test was offered. Specifically, the following sentence was added to the card: "In appreciation of your donation, we offer you this summer the possibility to check free of charge your cholesterol level directly in the blood donation center. This campaign lasts from June 6 to August 31, 2006." In the third treatment, the subjects were offered a lottery ticket. The text on the card was supplemented as follows:
"In appreciation, you get after your donation during this summer a lottery ticket from the Swiss State Lottery. This campaign lasts from June 6 to August 31, 2006." Both rewards had a material value of CHF 5.-(US$ 4.30). Irrespective of the invitation, all the donors who showed up were treated the same in a donation center. That is, even donors who did not, e.g., know that they would get a lottery ticket were offered one. The reason was that there was no practical way of checking which invitation a donor received when he or she showed up at the center. For this reason, the lottery ticket treatment could only be implemented at donation center 4, the second largest donation center. The other three donation centers (centers 1 to 3) offered the donors a free cholesterol test. The sequence of the treatments was randomized over days, i.e. each day, only one treatment was mailed out. Thus, the treatment is randomized only within weeks and within donation centers. This requires us to control for donation center, week, and weekday in the empirical analysis below.
B. Descriptive Statistics
In total, 12,268 blood donors were mailed an invitation during the experiment. Table 1 gives an overview over the number of observations in each treatment. We aimed at having 1/2 of the observations in the cholesterol test / lottery ticket treatment, 1/4 in the appeal, and 1/4 in the baseline, in each center, respectively. Table 2 shows the mean age, and percent female per treatment. As can be seen, the means are very similar, which is not surprising given the procedure that was applied. Figure 1 gives an overview over the behavior of the donors in the year prior to the experiment. As can be seen in the figure, between 45 and 50 percent of the individuals who receive an invitation show up to donate blood. Of these, we distinguish two outcomes: usable donations, i.e. donations that passed all the medical screens, and rejected donations, i.e., donations that failed one or more of the medical screens and could not be used. These tests range from criteria such as no flu episode over the last three weeks, to restrictions on travel over the last six months (e.g. to malaria regions), blood pressure limits, and HB counts. As can be seen, there is a stable fraction of approximately 5 percentage points of the invitations that result in rejected donations. Thus, rejected donations occur regularly even within our sample of repeat donors. We take the outcome variable rejected donations as a proxy for at-risk donations. For given screening procedures and screening criteria, we assume that a higher fraction of rejected donations indicates a higher risk of an undetected infectious blood component. Figure 2 displays the outcomes during the experimental period. The first bar shows the overall outcomes: On average, an invitation generated a useable donation with probability 0.42, and a rejected donation with frequency 0.05. This is similar to what was observed a year earlier.
The figure also shows the experimental outcomes for five subgroups. Based on people's history of blood donations, we grouped the subjects into five groups in the following way: Of the last four invitations sent to a subject, how many times did he/she show up to donate blood? In order to define this in a clean way, we exclude all the individuals who have received less than four invitations before the experiment. This reduces the sample to 10,490 observations. The 6 bars show that the past frequency of donation is a powerful predictor of current donations.
Therefore, we will use this variable to group individuals by their preference for blood donations.
From Figure 2 , it can also be seen that the absolute frequency of rejected donations also increases with the number of donations in response to the previous invitations. Thus, rejected donations do not only occur in infrequent or new donors, they are common across the pool of donors.
C. Behavioral Predictions
In this subsection, we discuss the predictions of different theories for three key outcomes in our experiment: Usable donations, rejected donations and the relative effectiveness of different incentives. We distinguish between usable donations and rejected donations, because this strategy allows us to disentangle the impact of our treatments on the motivation of donors and their impact on selecting donors. We proceed by first examining the impact of the experiment on usable donations, and then study whether there are effects on the frequency of rejected donations to be expected.
We focus on two types of theories that propose systematically different models of interaction between material incentives and prosocial motivation. First generation models of prosocial behavior in economics treat offers of material rewards as selective incentives that generate a standard relative price effect (see, e.g., the review of theoretical contributions on prosocial motivation in Andreoni (2007) ). Material incentives are thus predicted to have a non-negative effect on the required behavior, i.e. the voluntary contributions.
In contrast, second generation models of prosocial behavior propose a much richer structure for the possible interaction between material incentives and prosocial motivation. A first approach assumes a change in preferences due to an external intervention. Research from psychology posits that incentives can undermine the intrinsic motivation for a task (Deci and Ryan, 1985; Lepper and Greene, 1978) . The basic idea is that incentives change the way individuals think about an activity: if incentives are used, performing the activity may reduce the perception of self-determination or self-esteem and thus the level of prosocial motivation. Overall, a lower level of activity may result. These mechanisms and potential applications in economics are discussed more extensively in Frey (1997) and Frey and Jegen (2001) . A formalization of the approach can be found in Frey and Oberholzer-Gee (1997) .
A second approach takes preferences as fixed and instead emphasizes agents' self-perception. In a recent model by Bénabou and Tirole (2006) , individuals differ in how much they like to contribute to the prosocial activity and how much they like money. Individuals also have an image concern, i.e. they would like to be seen as an individual who likes contributing to the prosocial activity and who is not greedy (i.e., has a low marginal utility of money). Thus, in choosing an action, an individual also takes into account what this signals about her type. As Bnabou and Tirole show, in this case, it is possible that incentives reduce the level of an activity.
The reason is that if incentives are introduced, the activity now also becomes informative of the marginal utility of money, whereas it didnt in their absence. Thus, if performing the activity emits a strong signal of greediness, individuals may engage less in the prosocial activity.
Usable Donations: The first outcome we look at is the frequency of usable donations, i.e. the probability that an invitation led to a donation that passed all medical screens. The main and simple prediction from the first generation models on prosocial behavior in economics is a non-negative effect on usable donations if a material incentive is offered.
The prediction is less clear if psychological theories are taken into account and prosocial motivation or perceptions are endogenous to the use of incentives. Then, offering a material incentive not only creates a relative price effect increasing blood donations but also either a negative effect on prosocial motivation or a lower signal value. In sum, the sign of the net effect is undetermined and a lower level of blood donations is possible. The model further makes the prediction that any negative effect should be largest for those individuals with the strongest intrinsic motivation to donate. We measure the strength of the preference to donate by the propensity to react to invitations prior to the experiment as shown in Figure 2 . Thus, these theories predict a larger negative effect or a smaller positive effect on individuals with a high propensity to donate blood in the past.
However, for a negative effect to occur in the model extended for image concerns donating blood must become more informative about the marginal utility of money than the prosocial activity. We make this notion precise in Appendix A. We believe that this is not met in this case, as donating blood when low-yield material incentives are offered as in our case, still carries much more information about the preference for the prosocial activity.
Rejected Donations: The second outcome we examine are rejected donations. We use rejected donations to measure potential selection effects of incentives. Material incentives are predicted to generate additional at-risk donations because individuals are less likely to reveal their full medical history and information about past risky behavior in order not to be disqualified as donors (and thus to compromise the reward). This effect is captured in increased rejected donations if bloodscreening tests detect at least some of these cases. Previous studies indicate that, in the few instances in which blood donors are paid for blood donations, there is a significantly higher risk of infection markers in these donations (Eastlund, 1998; van der Poel et al., 2002) . However, in these studies, there is scope for to attract donors with poor characteristics over the long-run. In contrast, in our treatment, there is much less scope to attract new "low-quality" donors, since all our subjects are previous donors, and no incentives have been used prior to the experiment. Further, the incentives are much smaller than in these other studies. Thus, we do not expect much of a selection effect for the treatment using the lottery ticket as an incentive. However, as the data indicate, even among our donors, there is a substantial fraction of donations that have to be rejected. Our treatment offering a cholesterol test may therefore be more directly associated with a donor's health status. That correlation, however, could go either way: There could be positive selection effects in that health-conscious donors respond strongly to the test, or negative selection effects if individuals with poor health seek health tests. Previous evidence favors the latter (Sanchez et al., 2001 ).
The Relative Effectiveness of Incentives: Previous evidence from survey studiessuggests that blood donors prefer being offered a health test rather than a material reward such as a lottery ticket (Glynn et al., 2003) . This is in stark contrast to the prediction from any model in economics, in which there is a strong intuition that fungible material rewards are more useful to individuals than in-kind rewards. Thus, the economic model predicts that the lottery ticket is more effective than the cholesterol test, while survey evidence on blood donors' attitudes suggests the opposite.
D. The Empirical Strategy
As described earlier, we examine two experimental outcomes, usable and rejected donations. We model the probability that a usable donation is generated as
where use is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the invitation of individual i (invited to center c on day t) resulted in a usable donation and zero if it did not. The vector treat is a set of dummy variables, equal to one if the respective treatment was mailed out in center c on date t, and zero otherwise. Thus, the vector γ summarizes the impact of the treatments on the probability to donate blood relative to the baseline invitation. The vector x contains demographic controls such as age, gender, and the donation history of the individual prior to the experiment. The variable δ c (t) is a week fixed effect of date t in center c. 5 We allow these week effects to differ across centers. We also allow separate weekday fixed effects ω c (t). There is an immediate reasons to do this, as not all centers are open for donations on all weekdays. This affects the attractiveness of other weekdays in a center-specific way. Given the way the treatments were rolled out over time, this specification ensures that conditional on these variables, the treatment variation is fully randomized.
We assume that e i is normally distributed with variance 1, thus equation (1) results in a probit model. We always report marginal effects in our tables. 6 We have also estimated linear probability models based on (1), and the estimated coefficients are very similar, as are all conclusions about statistical significance.
The second experimental outcome we examine is the donations that had to be rejected. We adopt the same strategy in estimating the impact of the treatments on this outcome.
III. Results
A. The Overall Treatment Effects
We present the results in two steps. We first show a raw comparison of the treatments, normalizing the data only by donation center × donor frequency. With the randomization procedure described in section II, it is necessary to remove possible center differences. We additionally normalize by past donor frequency, in order to make the treatment effects comparable throughout all graphs. We then present the estimates from the probit models, also controlling for centerspecific week effects, and center-specific weekday effects, at which level our treatments are fully randomized.
Usable Donations: Turning to the impact of the treatments, Figure 3 shows the treatment outcomes, normalized by the mean of donation center×donor frequency over all treatments. The figure shows the change in the fraction of usable donations of the three treatments relative to the baseline invitation, along with the standard error of the mean. As can be seen in the figure, there is almost no effect of the appeal alone, and only a weak effect of the free cholesterol test. The lottery ticket, however, has a positive effect and appears to be the most effective of the three treatments. The frequency of donations is about four percentage points higher than in the baseline treatment Table 3 presents the marginal effects from probit estimates. The first column shows the estimates using the entire sample, and controlling for center-specific week effects and center-specific weekday effects. The second column adds gender and age as control variables. The third column restricts the sample to donors who have received at least four invitations prior to the experiment. In this column, we also add fixed effects for the number of times an individual donated blood in response to the last four invitations. The third column is our preferred specification, as it controls most tightly for differences between donors. The estimates confirm the qualitative picture from figure 3: The only treatment with an economically significant impact on donations is the lottery ticket: The point estimate is always around 5 percentage points, irrespective of the specification, and it is statistically significant. Turning to our preferred specification (column 3), we also see that the lottery ticket is more effective than the appeal (p = 0.049). This shows that the lottery ticket increased participation over and above what could be attributed to the information contained in the extra postcard enclosed with the invitation.
Thus, the overall positive treatment effect of the lottery ticket on usable donations is in line with the standard prediction for selective incentives in economics. While previous donors in surveys rate free cholesterol testing as a valuable reward, surprisingly the healt test is ineffective in increasing blood donations. In fact, the lottery ticket is significantly more effective (p = 0.09) as predicted with regard to the relative effectiveness of fungible and non-fungible material incentives. Our results show no evidence of any of the two material incentives reducing blood donations, as derived as a potential outcome from psychological theories on the interaction between incentives and prosocial motivation.
Rejected Donations: We now turn to the second experimental outcome, which is the frequency with which an invitation resulted in a donor being rejected or a blood donation being discarded.
The second panel in Figure 3 shows our first cut at the treatment effects, using only the crude normalizations to approximate randomization. There is no strong indication that any of the treatments had a clear selection effect. The point estimate for the cholesterol test is largest, but also has a substantial standard error. The results in columns (4) to (6) of Table 3 show the marginal effects from probit estimations. They estimate the impact of the cholesterol test somewhat larger, and marginally significant, at least in our preferred specification with the tightest controls in place. Thus, if anything, the cholesterol test treatment increased the fraction of rejected donations, but not the fraction of usable donations.
B. Preferences for Blood Donations and the Response to the Experiment
As a next step, we examine how the response to the treatments differs by the preference to donate blood as measured by the frequency of donations prior to the experiment. We define two subsamples: Those individuals who only responded twice or less often to the last four invitations (infrequent donors), and those who donated three or four times (frequent donors).
Usable Donations:
We proceed in the same way as before: Figure 4 shows the raw response to the treatments for the two subsamples. The first panel shows the response of the infrequent donors to the experiment. The infrequent donors respond to the lottery ticket most strongly.
There is also an indication that the other two treatments (appeal and cholesterol test) have a small but positive effect. Turning to the frequent donors, the picture is qualitatively very different. In short, for these donors, no intervention seems to be able to raise contributions above the level achieved with the baseline invitation.
We turn to a formal statistical test of these features in Table 4 . In order to have a clean comparison between the two types of donors, we estimate separate probits for them. This way, we do not identify anything from restricting the effect of any of the controls to be the same across the two groups. Columns (1) and (2) display the estimates for the infrequent donors, columns (3) and (4) for the frequent donors. The respective second specification is the one that parallels our preferred specification from Table 3 . Studying the infrequent donors, the marginal effects from the probit model reflect the qualitative picture from Figure 4 . They show that the lottery ticket has a strongly positive effect, estimated at about a 9 percentage point increase in useable donations. This effect is quantitatively large, and statistically significant. In comparing the effect of the lottery ticket, we again see that it is more effective than the appeal (p = 0.07), even though, for this group of donors, the appeal alone also significantly raises donations by about 3 percentage points. The lottery ticket, again, also works better than the cholesterol test (p = 0.025), which has essentially no effect on donations. The estimates also confirm the impression that no treatment raises usable donations for the frequent donors: In fact, the appeal lowers usable donations to a sizeable extent. The point estimates on the lottery ticket and the cholesterol test are actually negative, but not statistically significant. The effect of the lottery ticket is also not statistically significantly different from the one of the appeal treatment, or from the cholesterol test.
It is also interesting to compare the estimates across donor groups. We clearly reject that the overall response to the treatments is the same in the two groups (p < 0.01). Some of this effect is driven by the negative response of the frequent donors to mailing them the appeal. However, the lottery ticket also works significantly better for infrequent donors than for frequent donors (p = 0.05).
Rejected Donations: Turning to the impact of the treatments for rejected donations in the two subgroups, Figure 5 gives a first impression of the results. Again, there are no large effects visible. The formal estimates are presented in Table 5 . In both subsamples, point estimates for the selection effect are largest for the cholesterol test. However, the effects estimated based on fewer observations than in the full sample are not statistically significant. Overall, the results show no statistically significant differences in the responses between the two subsamples.
Interpretation: To summarize, the evidence presented in this section shows that the previous history of blood donation modulates the response to the treatments: Individuals who donated infrequently in the past repspond to the treatments more positively. In particular, using a lottery ticket as a selective incentive has a large and positive effect on their donations: Usable donations increase by approximately 9 percentage points -a large increase over the baseline of about 25 percent of usable donations in this group. This response is significantly different from the effect of the lottery ticket on frequent donors. In fact, we observe a small, albeit statistically insignificant, decline in usable donations from frequent donors when they are treated with the lottery ticket. Overall, these results are consistent with models in which heterogeneity between donors stems from their motivation to donate blood. For instance, in the model of Bénabou and Tirole (2006) , obviously individuals with a low motivation to donate blood do so at a lower rate. Moreover, their marginal costs are lower, and thus it is easier to move them to donate more by increasing the rewards somewhat. The result that the response to the lottery ticket is significantly stronger for the infrequent donors can even be interpreted as consistent with a motivation crowding-out effect (though the smoking gun evidence would have been a drop in donations for frequent donors in the treatments with material incentives). For the less motivated donors, the net effect from the positive relative price effect and the negative but small motivation crowing effect is larger than for the motivated donors who experience a larger motivation crowding effect. However, the fact that the lottery ticket has no measurable effect on rejected donations (overall as well as in subsamples) militates against a reduction of prosocial motivation by using this incentive in this pool of donors, at least.
In contrast to evidence from surveys (Glynn et al., 2003) , we do not find that the cholesterol test works well. Neither for less nor more motivated donors, usable donations increase in response to the cholesterol test. Our evidence shows that, to the contrary, the lottery ticket works significantly better than the cholesterol test in the overall sample. This effect mainly stems from the infrequent donors, for which there is a large difference, while for frequent donors, this seems to matter much less. If anything, our evidence indicates that offering a cholesterol test increases the undesirable outcome of rejected donations. Thus, our results constitute an example in which it is important to examine behavior, not attitudes as measured in a survey.
C. Responses in other Subsamples
In this subsection, we examine implications from alternative interpretations of our results. In particular, we examine whether any of the differences in the response to the treatments that we found by cutting the sample by the frequency of donations, are due to some other characteristics related to the frequency of donations. For example, gender is highly correlated with donations.
Per invitation, women generate with a 5 percentage points lower probability a usable donation in our sample (see Table 3 ). Moreover, a previous study (Mellström and Johannesson, forthcoming) has found that women respond less well to incentives. We also examine whether the differences in treatment effects stem from differences in age. Older donors respond more reliably on invitations:
for every year of age usable donations increase by 0.5 percentage point. Finally, we examine whether the difference in treatment effects should be interpreted as a difference in commitment to a regular donation schedule rather than a difference in the preference for blood donations.
Usable Donations: Table 6 presents the results. As it is important to control for all possible characteristics that may influence blood donations, in this excercise, we only present the strictest specifications. In columns (1) and (2), we cut the sample by gender. As can be seen, there is no overall difference in the response to the treatments. Men and women display the same pattern in response to the treatments. In particular, there is no difference in response to the lottery ticket. This is in contrast to Mellström and Johannesson (forthcoming) , who find that women respond less well to incentives. In columns (3) and (4), we cut the sample by age. We use 45, the median age in our sample, as the age cutoff. Again, we find overall no statistically significant difference in the response to the treatments. The point estimate of the lottery ticket is somewhat higher for young donors than for old donors. However, the difference is not statistically significant at conventional levels (p = 0.18) and the difference between subsamples is more pronounced and of statistical significance when we cut the sample by the frequency of donations. Thus, we view age as a proxy variable for the frequency with which people respond to an invitation, not the other way around. Finally, we examine whether the observed differences are not due to differences in the preference for donations, but rather differences in the regularity of schedules for donations. Maybe the more frequent donors have a fixed schedule that they like, and simply do not deviate from this schedule. This could explain why infrequent donors are more responsive to our interventions. We can test this interpretation in the following way: The blood donation service offers the possibility to indicate at which interval one wants to be invited for blood donations. If nothing is indicated, the invitations are at least four months apart, but random.
Donors can indicate any preference, i.e., an invitation every four, six, or twelve months. This allows us to distinguish strength of prosocial preference from commitment to a regular donation schedule. A little more than a third of the individuals indicate such a preference for regular invitations. Columns (5) and (6) present the results. As can be seen, there is no meaningful difference in the point estimates of the treatment effects, and a formal statistical test fails to reject equality of the treatment effects across the two samples.
Rejected Donations: The exercise with subsamples is also conducted for the outcome of rejected donations. The results are presented in Table 7 . Surprisingly, we find some indications of differences, at least with respect to the cholesterol test. There are significant effects of the cholesterol test on rejected donations for women, young donors, and donors who did not choose a regular donation schedule. However, we caution against too strongly interpreting these results for two reasons. First, even with respect to the cholesterol test, the differences between subsamples are only weakly statistically significant in the case of men vs. women, and not statistically significant in the other two cases. Second, no specific hypothesis lead us to look for these differences.
Therefore, the p-values on these three tests would have to be adjusted for multiple hypothesis tests. Once one corrects for this (using the Holm, 1979, procedure) , the only effect significant at conventional levels is the effect of the cholesterol test on women's rejected donations.
In sum, none of the alternative interpretations can explain the results we established in the previous section: There are no gender differences, age differences, or differences in commitment with regard to donation schedules that could explain our results. These findings further corroborate our interpretation that the differences in response to the treatments are related to preferences for blood donations.
IV. Summary and Conclusions
Laboratory evidence and field experiments show that the intrinsic motivation for prosocial activities can be crowded out by the use of incentives (Ariely et al., 2007; Gneezy and Rustichini, 2000a,b) . In particular, for small incentives, voluntary contributions have been shown to be significantly lower than when no incentives are used. There is the longstanding concern at least since Titmuss (1971) provocative work that this mechanism plays an important role for blood donations as well, which rely heavily on the prosocial motivations of the donors. In this paper, we empirically test how incentives affect blood donations in a large-scale field experiment over three months with more than 10,000 blood donors. This paper provides the first comprehensive empirical test of the Titmuss hypothesis by examining different forms of incentives. We offer either a lottery ticket or a free cholesterol test to the donors. Both selective incentives are with fairly low value to the donor so that they could plausibly lead to the crowding-out effects observed in other domains.
Our results indicate no negative effects of incentives on usable blood donations. In fact, the lottery ticket proves an effective incentive to raise blood donations. In a second control treatment, we difference out a possible effect of simply appealing to donors, and still find a significant increase in useable donations when donors are offered a lottery ticket. When we examine more closely how the treatment effect varies with the preference for blood donations, we find that offering a lottery ticket has the largest effect on donors with a historically weak preference for blood donations, while it is completely ineffective for donors who care more about blood donations, and the treatment effects are statistically significantly different for the two groups. This pattern is broadly consistent with a model with heterogeneity in the preference for blood donations. We also find that the lottery ticket is far more effective than offering a free cholesterol test, in contrast to survey studies asking donors how appealing they find different types of incentives (Glynn et al., 2003) .
This raises the question why the lottery ticket is so effective in raising donations, when monetary incentives have shown to have negative effects in lab experiments and field studies. One could argue that the lottery ticket is not really perceived as a payment, but rather as a signal of goodwill on the part of the blood donation service, and that this is what the individuals are responding to, not the financial value of the lottery ticket. However, the same should be true for the cholesterol test. Yet, we do not find that the latter raises donations. Thus, this explanation does not account for the differences between the two types of incentives we examine. A second possible interpretation is that it is not the money, but rather the gambling aspect that dominated in the perception of the lottery ticket. Had we used the equivalent of money, it would have had the negative consequences observed in other studies. This conjecture could be easily tested in a lab setting. However, even if it were true, our results suggest an easy way for organizations to circumvent it by using lottery tickets instead of money.
We also examine the outcome of rejected donations, i.e., donations that had to be discarded because they failed a medical test, or donors that showed up but had to be turned away in the initial screening at the blood donation center. We take rejected donations as a proxy for the selection of at-risk donors. Ten percent of all donations have to be rejected even among previous donors, thus it is important to know whether the use of incentives changes this outcome and indicates negative selection effects. We find no effect of the lottery ticket on rejected donations. This may not be very surprising, as the stakes are rather low, and the donor pool was fixed. More negative consequences could be expected if higher payments were used on a permanent basis because this may attract new donors with worse characteristics. Still, we find some evidence that offering the health test leads to somewhat more rejected donations. Apparently, the offer of the cholesterol test is particularly attractive to donors with poor temporary health, making the health test even less desirable as an incentive.
Overall, our results suggest that selective incentives and prosocial motivations may coexist even in domains that heavily rely on peoples intrinsic motivation. Thus, in light of the reoccuring seasonal shortages and a steady tightening of donor criteria, incentives may prove useful to motivate previous blood donors to donate more. More broadly, our results raise the question whether selective incentives could also be fruitfully applied in other settings, such as volunteering.
More controlled experiments are needed to further examine these issues. .6
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Figure 2: The Outcomes during the Experiment
Notes: A usable donation leads to a blood product. A rejected donation is one where either the donor is rejected in the initial screening or the donation fails one of the screening tests after the donation. Notes: All specifications include a full set of dummy variables for donation center × week and donation center × weekday. Other controls also include a full set of dummy variables indicating the minimum time difference between invitations set by the donation center. Baseline treatment is the standard invitation. "Appeal" means a special card was added to the invitation, calling them up to donate. "Lottery ticket" means that on this card, the subjects were offered a lottery ticket if they showed up. "CH test" means that on the card, the subjects were offered free cholesterol test if they showed up. 26 Notes: All specifications include a full set of dummy variables for donation center × week and donation center × weekday. Other controls also include a full set of dummy variables indicating the minimum time difference between invitations set by the donation center. a χ 2 (3)-test for equality of treatment effects in columns (1) and (3). b χ 2 (3)-test for equality of treatment effects in columns (2) and (4). Baseline treatment is the standard invitation. "Appeal" means a special card was added to the invitation, calling them up to donate. "Lottery ticket" means that on this card, the subjects were offered a lottery ticket if they showed up. "CH test" means that on the card, the subjects were offered free cholesterol test if they showed up. Notes: All specifications include a full set of dummy variables for donation center × week and donation center × weekday. Other controls also include a full set of dummy variables indicating the minimum time difference between invitations set by the donation center. a χ 2 (3)-test for equality of treatment effects in columns (1) and (3). b χ 2 (3)-test for equality of treatment effects in columns (2) and (4). Baseline treatment is the standard invitation. "Appeal" means a special card was added to the invitation, calling them up to donate. "Lottery ticket" means that on this card, the subjects were offered a lottery ticket if they showed up. "CH test" means that on the card, the subjects were offered free cholesterol test if they showed up. Notes: Notes: Age cutoff is 45. All specification include a full set of dummy variables for donation center × week and donation center × weekday. See Table 3 for further notes. Notes: Notes: Age cutoff is 45. All specification include a full set of dummy variables for donation center × week and donation center × weekday. See Table 3 for further notes.
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